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Leaving a Trace in the World (II): Deconstruction and the History of Life 
Mauro Senatore 
Durham University 
There [in the trace] we have all history, 
from what metaphysics has defined as 
“non-living” up to “consciousness,” 
passing through all levels of animal 
organization.  
--Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 
 
Abstract: This article tests the hypothesis that the history of life can be told only by 
assuming the ultra-transcendental conception of life as leaving a trace in the world. It draws 
together two moments in the work of Jacques Derrida that are chronologically distant and yet 
develop that hypothesis and its consequences: the deconstruction of the phenomenological 
concept of consciousness, and the deconstruction of the Cartesian narrative of life. The article 
demonstrates that the first moment allows us to elaborate the ultra-transcendental conception 
of life presupposed by phenomenological consciousness, which offers new ways to analyze 
biological questions of the origin and evolution of life, and ethico-political questions of 
responsibility. 
 
I. 
 In the passage from Of Grammatology (1967) chosen as the epigraph of this essay, 
Jacques Derrida draws a decisive implication from his formalization of the concept of the 
trace. The trace, as the most general possibility of repetition and thus as the common root of 
passive retention and active recollection, calls into question the distinction, if not the abyss, 
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conjured up by metaphysics between the living, qua consciousness, and the non-living, qua 
animals and machines, or animal-machines. This implication opens up the history of life, as 
leaving a trace in the world, and the history of its evolution, from the most elementary forms 
of living to consciousness. Therefore, Derrida argues, the deconstruction of metaphysics 
through the formula of the trace allows us to liberate the history of life: we can tell this 
history only by starting from the trace.   
 In the pages that follow, I put this argument to the test and point to its 
repercussions―for example, for ethico-political questions of responsibility―by focusing on 
two key moments in Derrida’s work: the deconstruction of the phenomenological concept of 
voice and the deconstruction of the so-called Cartesian conception of human auto-relation 
(autodeictic autotelicity). These moments are chronologically thirty years apart and yet, as we 
will see, are interwoven by Derrida himself in the act of sketching his intellectual 
autobiography.1 As my reading develops, we understand that the liberation of the history of 
life is a consequence of the deconstruction of the metaphysical project at stake in 
phenomenology, which consists in dissimulating the entanglement of consciousness and the 
trace. From this deconstruction, it follows that we can only think of consciousness as an 
effect of the trace and that we must reinscribe within the liberated history of life metaphysical 
distinctions such as those between reaction and response, or between automation and 
freedom, which in turn hinge on the metaphysical concept of consciousness.     
 
II. 
 Let us start by examining how, since his first deconstructive work, Voice and 
Phenomenon (1967; hereafter VP), Derrida allows himself to tell the history of life as leaving 
a trace in the world through the deconstruction of the phenomenological concept of voice.2 
This work engages a deconstructive reading of chapter one of Logical Investigations 1, in 
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which Husserl elaborates the phenomenological concept of sign. Derrida takes this text as a 
privileged example for showing that the phenomenological critique of metaphysics 
constitutes the historical achievement of the originary metaphysical project.3 As he suggests, 
we can identify the central motif of this critique as the denunciation of metaphysical 
perversions in the understanding of the authentic mode of ideality. For Husserl, ideality 
consists in the form in which the presence of the object can be repeated indefinitely as 
identical to itself. By definition, this form does not exist (it is non-real, unreal, etc.) to the 
extent that it does not depend on an empirical or worldly existence.4 Now, Derrida goes on, 
the possibility of the ideal form and thus of the indefinite repetition of the presence of the 
object as identical to itself can be secured only in the presence of the living present or the 
self-presence of transcendental life. Therefore, for Husserl, the latter constitutes the ultimate 
form of ideality. Derrida summarizes this convergence of ideality, the living present, and 
transcendental life as follows:  
So that the possibility of this repetition can be open idealiter to infinity, it is necessary 
that one ideal form secures this unity of the indefinitely and the idealiter: this is the 
present, or rather the presence of the living present. The ultimate form of ideality, the 
one in which in the last analysis we can anticipate or recall all repetition, the ideality 
of ideality is the living present, the self-presence of transcendental life. (VP 5-6) 
The phenomenological concept of consciousness is structurally linked to the claim for an 
authentic mode of ideality. As the ideal form grants the presence of the object to 
consciousness, consciousness is determined by the very possibility of ideality and, ultimately, 
by the presence of the living present.5 Difficulties arise when Husserl allows that the ideal 
object is the historical product of a constitutive act of language and that consciousness 
consists in the possibility of this act. Does it follow from this that the element of 
consciousness and the element of language are indiscernible, and thus that the presence of 
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transcendental life is originarily divided by the worldly and empirical synthesis of language? 
In Derrida’s words, “is it not the case that their indiscernibility will introduce non-presence 
and difference (mediacy, the sign, referral, etc.) right into the heart of self-presence?” (VP 
13). Derrida argues that Husserl addresses this difficulty by appealing to the concept of voice 
(voix). However, he explains, this difficulty does not represent a weakness immanent to the 
Husserlian system. Rather, although Husserl shares the appeal to voice with the whole history 
of metaphysics, his concept of phenomenological voice brings this history to its most refined 
achievement. Phenomenological voice, in fact, does not seem to require a worldly synthesis 
and thus would protect transcendental life from the threat of non-presence and difference 
implicit in the indiscernibility of language and consciousness. Derrida formalizes the 
Husserlian solution to metaphysical difficulty par excellence as follows: “Husserl will not 
recognize an originative affinity with the logos in general in the sonorous substance or in the 
physical voice, or in the body of the voice in the world; rather the originative affinity will be 
recognized in the phenomenological voice, in the voice in its transcendental flesh” (VP 14).  
 Derrida draws this concept of phenomenological voice from Husserl’s well-known 
distinction between Anzeichen, the so-called index/indication, the sign that does not express 
anything because it does not convey meaning (Bedeutung), and Ausdruck, or expression.6 
Voice designates the phenomenological situation in which this distinction is accomplished 
and expression is no longer entangled with indication. Given the irreducibility of this 
entanglement in worldly or empirical communication―for reasons that will appear evident in 
a moment―this situation can only be found “in a language without communication, in a 
monological discourse, in the absolutely lowest register of the voice of the ‘solitary life of the 
soul’” (VP 19). Derrida explains that the condition for this situation is a certain relation to the 
ideal object, “the relation to the object, the aim of an objective ideality, over and against the 
intention of meaning [vouloir-dire], over and against the Bedeutungsintention” (VP 19). This 
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relation constitutes the phenomenological project in its essence―that is, the 
phenomenological idea of transcendental idealism.7 Disentangled and pure expression secures 
the exteriorization―still within consciousness and not in the world―of this relation to the 
object. There, as Derrida puts it, the voice animated by intention expresses the intended 
object.8 
 Derrida offers a close reading of the progressive reductions of indication by means of 
which Husserl delimits the access to pure expression. As these reductions develop, he points 
out that indication designates the fact that the animating intention present to itself in 
transcendental life (namely, psychē or spirit) goes out of itself and thus relates to non-
presence, difference, and, ultimately, death. But this relation to death accounts for the very 
process of signification and, more precisely, of writing, the latter being the sign that works 
beyond and thanks to the absence of its animating intention. By reducing indication and thus, 
as we anticipated, by appealing to pure expression and phenomenological voice, Husserl 
wishes, according to Derrida, to dissimulate the relation to death that is at work in 
signs―namely, the originary and irreducible possibility of writing that Derrida designates as 
archi-writing. I quote this long passage as it constitutes a key moment in the deconstructive 
reading of the phenomenological concept of sign:  
Pure expressivity will be the pure active intention (spirit, psyche, life, will) of a 
bedeuten that is animating a discourse whose content (Bedeutung) will be present. It is 
present not in nature, since indication alone takes place in nature and in space, but in 
consciousness. Therefore it is present to an “internal” intuition or to an “internal” 
perception. But we just understood why it is present to an intuition that is not that of 
the other in a case of communication. Therefore this is self-present in the life of a 
present that has still not exited from itself into the world, into space, into nature. With 
all of these “exitings” exiling this life of self-presence into indication, we can be sure 
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that indication, which covers so far nearly the entire surface of language, is the 
process of death at work in the signs. (VP 34)9  
At this point, we wonder how phenomenological voice is supposed to respond to the 
difficulty of metaphysics―that is, to the threat of death implicit in the process of 
signification and thus in idealization. To what extent, as Derrida puts it, “between idealization 
and the voice, the complicity is here unfailing” (VP 64)? A medium is required to preserve 
the two features of authentic ideality: “the presence of the object in front of the intuition and 
the presence to oneself, the absolute proximity of the acts to themselves” (VP 65). This 
medium would be an exteriorization of transcendental life in which voice does not go out of 
itself and, therefore, does not undergo the work of death. But that seems to be precisely 
phenomenological voice in the way its phenomenon is given, in its proximity to the speaking 
subject in the present moment of enunciation.10 Phenomenological voice thus seems to 
account for a kind of auto-relation (for-itself, or subjectivity), that of the “I” hearing itself 
speak, which preserves the self-presence of transcendental life and for which Derrida takes 
recourse to the concept of auto-affection. “Why is the phoneme the most ‘ideal’ of signs?” 
(VP 66), Derrida asks. Because the being in the present of the phonic signifier retains the 
latter close to the animating intention, thus seeming to prevent it from going out of itself and 
relating to its death. Derrida writes:  
The signifier that is animated by my breath and by the intention of signification (in 
Husserlian language the expression animated by the Bedeutungsintention) is 
absolutely close to to me. The living act, the act that gives life, the Lebendigkeit that 
animates the body of the signifier and transforms it into an expression that wants to 
say, the soul of language, seems not to separate itself from itself, from its presence to 
itself. The soul of language does not risk death in the body of a signifier abandoned to 
the world and to the visibility of space. (VP 66-67)11 
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Therefore, phenomenological voice aims to respond to the difficulty represented by the 
indistinguishability of consciousness and language. The pure auto-affection of the I’s hearing 
itself speak displays the very meaning of the term “con-sciousness”―that is, the possibility 
of the indefinite repetition of the object as identical to itself and, ultimately, the self-presence 
of transcendental life. “The voice is being close to itself in the form of universality, as con-
sciousness. The voice is consciousness” (VP 68), Derrida argues. Pure auto-affection 
describes a non-real communication in which I hear the other speak as if it were me. “To 
speak to someone [in what is understood as the phenomenological speech or voice],” he goes 
on, “is to make the other repeat immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the very 
form in which I have produced it” (VP 68). Finally, we come to the reading of the 
phenomenological concept of consciousness as pure auto-affection. This concept―evoked by 
Derrida in the epigraph of this essay―grounds the metaphysical distinction between the 
living and the non-living and thus opens up the abyss between consciousness and the other 
forms of life, foreclosing the history of life. In the subsequent pages of his book, Derrida 
deconstructs this concept by demonstrating that we must think auto-affection from the 
trace―that is, from the most general possibility of signification. Idealization cannot be 
dissociated from the process of death at work in signs and thus from the originary and no 
longer reducible possibility of writing, or archi-writing.12  
 Phenomenological voice is the most ideal of signs, but it is still a sign―that is, a 
worldly synthesis, which carries non-presence and difference within pure auto-affection. 
“Auto-affection as the operation of the voice,” Derrida writes, “assumed that a pure 
difference came to divide self-presence” (VP 70). Here we discover the movement of 
“différance” that inhabits the living present. This movement opens up transcendental life onto 
what is supposed to be suspended by transcendental reduction and thus onto the relation to 
death and originary writing.13 It thus consists in the self’s relation to itself as different or 
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other than itself.14 Later, we see that this understanding of auto-affection and auto-relation as 
différance, as the originary possibility of writing, or as the trace, refers the transcendental 
subject back to the most general definition of life as leaving a trace in the world, at the same 
time as it accounts for life’s evolution. In other words, we find in différance the point of 
departure for telling the history of life.15   
 At this point, the deconstruction of phenomenological voice and thus of consciousness 
requires one last step. If the privileging of voice over the other media of signification seems 
to be linked to its purely temporal structure―the fact that it is given in the present―then the 
movement of différance must have already been at work within the “temporal fabric” of voice 
(71).16 To demonstrate this claim, Derrida recalls a passage from the lectures on the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time in which Husserl describes the 
movement of temporalization as pure auto-affection―namely, genesis spontanea.17 I cannot 
engage with Derrida’s analyses of this immense philosophical problem here, and limit myself 
to highlighting his argument and its effects on the problem of the history of life. Derrida 
suggests that what Husserl calls genesis spontanea is the process by which the now 
constitutes itself by making itself into a retention or a retentional trace. He describes this 
process as follows: “the living now, producing itself by spontaneous generation, must, in 
order to be a now, be retained in another now, must affect itself, without empirical recourse, 
with a new originary actuality in which it will become a non-now as a past now” (VP 72-73). 
Ultimately, the movement of temporalization as pure auto-affection would have already been 
the movement of différance or of the originary possibility of writing―here designated as 
archi-writing: 
The living present arises on the basis of its non-self-identity, and on the basis of the 
retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace is unthinkable if we start from 
the simplicity of a present whose life would be interior to itself. The self of the living 
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present is originarily a trace. The trace is not an attribute about which we could say 
that the self of the living present “is originarily” the trace. It is necessary to think 
originary-being from the trace and not the trace from originary-being. This archi-
writing is at work in the origin of sense. (VP 73) 
Not only can the living present not be dissociated from the trace; above all, the living present 
turns out to be reinscribed within the history of life as leaving a trace in the world. First, as 
Derrida points out, the movement of temporalization described above calls into question the 
privileging of phenomenological voice as a merely temporal structure.18 Secondly―and this 
is what matters to us more―the trace, qua the originary possibility of repetition that allows us 
to think auto-affection or auto-relation in general, accounts for the history in which the 
becoming conscious of life is possible. I refer to the text in which, although in passing, 
Derrida highlights the link between the history of life and the trace: “without concealing that 
the problem of their relations [between retention and re-presentation] is nothing other than 
the history of ‘life’ and of life’s becoming-conscious, we must be able to say a priori that 
their common root, the possibility of re-petition in its most general form, the trace” (VP 58; 
italics mine).  
 It is worth recalling that Derrida develops this link between the deconstruction of 
consciousness and the opening of the history of life in a footnote to Edmund Husserl’s Origin 
of Geometry: An Introduction (1962). This note sheds light on the premises of the argument 
that we have taken as the point of departure for our reading.19 In the Introduction, Derrida 
explains that, for Husserl, the living present constitutes the ultimate form of ideality to the 
extent that it secures the indefinite reactivation of meaning as identical to itself in the 
individual consciousness. On the margins of this explanation, he adds a deconstructive note 
in which he argues that Husserl cannot question the transition from the passive retention of 
meaning to its active recollection, as this transition constitutes the very axiom of 
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phenomenology―the principle of the self-presence of transcendental life and of the auto-
donation of consciousness. Derrida unfolds the consequences that follow from taking account 
of this transition and thus of the most general possibility of repetition (what he designates 
later as the trace) that is the common root of passive retention and active recollection and that 
allows for the transition between them. As he suggests, we would liberate the history of life 
as leaving a trace in the world and thus would retrace phenomenology back to a thinking that 
takes into account the becoming conscious of life. Derrida’s note reads: 
These processes are abundantly described in The Phenomenology of Internal-Time 
Consciousness, Ideas I, and in FTL. The passage from passive retention to memory or 
to the activity of recollection, a passage which “produces” ideality and pure 
Objectivity as such and makes other absolute origins appear as such, is always 
described by Husserl as an already given essential possibility, as a structural ability 
whose source is not made a problem. Perhaps this source is not questioned by 
phenomenology because it is confused with the possibility of phenomenology itself. 
In its “factuality,” this passage is also that of the lower forms of Nature and conscious 
life. It can also be the thematic site of what today is called an “overcoming.” Here 
phenomenology would be “overcome” or completed in an interpretative philosophy. 
(Edwin Husserl’s Origin of Geometry 86) 
The note then refers to the project of overcoming phenomenology through a dialectic of real 
movement as it is elaborated by the French-Vietnamese philosopher Tran Duc Thao in his 
Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism (1951). “Thus Trân-Dúc-Tháo,” Derrida writes, 
“after a remarkable interpretation of phenomenology, exposes the ‘Dialectic of Real 
Movement,’ starting from the concepts of retention and reproduction and from difficulties 
attached to them in phenomenology, which alone, however, can give them a rigorous sense” 
(An Introduction 86). Derrida’s concept of the becoming-conscious-of-life can be read as a 
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rewriting of Thao’s concept of the becoming-conscious-of-nature. Thao marks the transition 
from phenomenology to dialectic in the concluding pages of the first part of his work. He 
grounds the possibility of telling the history of life and of its evolution in the real movement 
of the constituting subjectivity that, according to him, results from transcendental reduction 
and yet is not just consciousness: 
We end with dialectical materialism as the truth of transcendental idealism. Since the 
naive attitude has been definitively suppressed by the reduction, the practice of the 
description of pure lived experience is necessarily absorbed within a dialectical 
materialism that suppresses it in its properly phenomenological sense in order to 
preserve it in its resultant form and to elevate it to a superior level. We maintain the 
authentic demands of the Weltkonstitution by getting rid of its idealistic illusions. It is, 
indeed, a matter of “bracketing” the world of constituted appearances, which the 
fetishism of naive consciousness takes for realities in themselves, and of returning to 
true being through the constituting subjectivity. But the latter is not the Heraclitean 
flux of pure consciousness: it is the real movement by which nature becomes 
conscious of itself in biological evolution and human history. (129)20  
Now, the movement that has taken us from the phenomenological concept of consciousness 
to the thinking of life as leaving a trace in the world leaves a question open. If we admit with 
Derrida that the general structure of the trace is another name for life, we may ask how this 
structure has been―and is yet to be―articulated across the history of life and evolution. 
Derrida addresses this question in a passage from Of Grammatology (1967), where he 
suggests that we need to take up again the indiscernibility of the elements of idealization and 
consciousness from différance and the trace. From this perspective, we understand the 
articulations of life as related to the degree of mastery that the living has over its own 
possibility, or power, of repeating the ideal object. Derrida thus explains: 
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This possibility—another name for “life”—is a general structure articulated by the 
history of life, and leading to complex and hierarchical operations. Auto-affection, the 
as-for-itself or for-itself—subjectivity—gains in power and in its mastery of the other 
to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself. Here idealization is the 
movement by which sensory exteriority, that which affects me or serves me as 
signifier, submits itself to my power of repetition, to what thenceforward appears to 
me as my spontaneity and escapes me less and less. (Of Grammatology 165-166) 
 
III. 
 In what follows, I focus on Derrida’s deconstruction of the Cartesian foundations of 
the modern narrative of life, as he develops it in the essays published in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (2006; hereafter AIA). My aim is to demonstrate that this deconstruction does 
not just hinge on the deconstruction of the phenomenological concept of consciousness that 
we have examined above. Instead, Derrida develops his conception of life as leaving a trace 
in the world by highlighting its implications for the modern distinction between animal and 
human auto-relation (namely, between auto-affection and autotelicity) and, consequently, for 
the concept of responsibility and its ethico-political elaborations.  
 In the concluding pages of the first essay included in the collection, Derrida focuses 
on two distinctions that characterize the modern narrative of life: the distinction between the 
organic and the inorganic and between the animal and the human. This narrative places the 
question of the difference between the animal and the human within the broader demarcation 
of the physico-chemical domain of the inorganic and the life of the living (namely, 
animality).21 Derrida reproduces this demarcation by having recourse to auto-affection (auto-
relation, auto-mobility, autobiography, tracing, etc.) which specifies the living being or the 
animal in general and thus seems to be shared with the human (identified as the ego cogito or 
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the “I think”). At this point, another demarcation―more properly, an abyss―has been 
conjured up within the domain of life and animality, between the animal and the human, and 
between auto-affection and “I think” (in the lexicon of Descartes, ego cogito), which is 
constituted by the power of transforming its traces into speech and thus of elaborating 
discursive responses. This narrative reads as follows:  
Animality, the life of the living, at least when one claims to be able to distinguish it 
from the inorganic, from the purely inert or cadaverous physico-chemical, is generally 
defined as sensibility, irritability, and auto-motricity, a spontaneity that is capable of 
movement, of organizing itself and affecting itself, marking, tracing, and affecting 
itself with traces of its self. This auto-motricity as auto-affection and relation to itself 
is the characteristic recognized as that of the living and of animality in general, even 
before one comes to consider the discursive thematic of an utterance or of an ego 
cogito, more so of a cogito ergo sum. But between this relation to the self (this Self, 
this ipseity) and the I of the “I think,” there is, it would seem, an abyss … No one has 
ever denied the animal this capacity to track itself, to trace itself or retrace a path of 
itself. Indeed, the most difficult problem lies in the fact that it has been refused the 
power to transform those traces into verbal language, to call to itself by means of 
discursive questions and responses, denied the power to efface its traces. (AIA 49-
50)22 
In Derrida’s reproduction of the modern narrative on animal and human auto-relation, the “I 
think” seems to share with the phenomenological concept of consciousness the feature of the 
self-presence of the living present in the element of speech. This narrative also seems to 
associate a certain ability to respond, or responsibility, to the human self that is present to 
itself and hears itself speak. As it is suggested in the aforementioned passage (see the 
reference to the cogito), Derrida finds in the Cartesian conception of the human self as “I 
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think” the very presupposition of this narrative.23 Therefore, in the second essay of the 
collection, he traces this Cartesian legacy through the close reading of two passages from the 
second Meditation (1641) and the letter to Henricus Reneri for Alphonse Pollot (1638), 
respectively. 
 First, Derrida analyses Descartes’s elaboration of the axiom of the modern history of 
life, that is, the traits of that special kind of auto-relation that Descartes ascribes to the human 
by dissociating it from animal auto-relation (auto-affection). To this end, he follows the text 
of the second Meditation as it demarcates the human self, the “I am,” from everything that 
can be detached from it. The passage under scrutiny begins with the following question: 
“What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man?” (Meditations 17). 
Descartes responds to this question by starting from what immediately comes to his mind: 
first, “the whole mechanical structure [toute cette machine] of limbs”; secondly, the fact that 
“I was nourished, that I moved about, and that I engaged in sense-perception, and thinking.”24 
Interestingly, Descartes attributes these “actions” to a “soul” that he imagines “to be 
something tenuous, like a wind or fire or ether” (Meditations 17). According to Derrida, these 
traits associated with a physical soul identify what Descartes understands by life or animality. 
“Each time that … he has to evoke these signs of life or animation—therefore of animality—
constituted by auto-affection or auto-motion,” Derrida points out, “he relates them to a living 
soul that … can only be a body” (AIA 72). As the reductions follow one another, Descartes 
comes to the point of determining the pure “I am” as a thinking thing. He writes: “Thinking? 
At last I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist—that is 
certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking” (Meditations 18). One cannot help 
interweaving this final reduction of animality and thus this determination of the human self 
together with what Derrida designates in Voice and Phenomenon as the metaphysical project 
itself, that is, the understanding of the ultimate form of ideality as the presence of the living 
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present. Indeed, Derrida reads Descartes’s passage as an affirmation of that project: “The 
presence to itself of the present of thinking, the presence that presents itself to itself in the 
present, that is what excludes everything detachable constituted by life, the living body, 
animal life” (AIA 72). Therefore, on Derrida’s reading, Descartes places at the basis of his 
narrative of life the metaphysical conception of the “I am” (as a self-present thinking thing). 
This conception constitutes the kind of auto-relation that specifies the human self and opens 
up the abyss from animality.  
 Secondly, Derrida examines the passage from the aforementioned letter to Reneri (for 
Pollot), in which Descartes establishes the limit of animality in the light of the metaphysical 
determination of the pure “I am.” In this passage, Descartes develops the point on 
responsibility that Derrida had evoked at the moment of recounting the modern narrative of 
life. Descartes invites the reader to distrust the judgement that animals have a soul as it 
amounts to an opinion rashly acquired in childhood. In support of his thesis, he sets up the 
following scene: 
Suppose that a man had been brought up all his life in some place where he had never 
seen any animals except men; and suppose that he was very devoted to the study of 
mechanics, and had made, or helped to make, various automatons shaped like a man, a 
horse, a dog, a bird, and so on, which walked and ate, and breathed, and so far as 
possible imitated all the other actions of the animals they resembled, including the 
signs we use to express our passions, like crying when struck and running away when 
subjected to a loud noise. Suppose that sometimes he found it impossible to tell the 
difference between the real men and those which had only the shape of men, and had 
learnt by experience that there are only the two ways of telling: … first, that such 
automatons never answer in word or sign, except by chance, to questions put to them; 
and secondly, correspond that though their movements are often more regular and 
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certain than those of the wisest men, yet in many things which they would have to do 
to imitate us, they fail more disastrously than the greatest fools. (The Philosophical 
Writings 99-100) 
From this fiction, according to Descartes, we should be able to reconsider our judgment 
before real animals.25 We should understand that “the resemblance between some exterior 
actions of animals and our own … is not at all a sufficient basis to prove that there is any 
resemblance between the corresponding interior actions” (The Philosophical Writings 100). 
Derrida draws attention to the fact that Descartes’s argument hinges on the presupposition of 
a limit or a threshold for the animal, that is, the ability to not react to a programmable 
question, like an automaton, but “to [freely] respond to true questioning” (AIA 82-83).26 The 
metaphysical determination of the human self as a self-present thinking thing secures this 
ability and thus marks the limit between animal and human auto-relation. As anticipated, 
Derrida formalizes this divide/abyss between animality and the human as the divide/abyss 
between two kinds of auto-relation, between auto-affection and “I think.” On the one hand, 
we have the way the living relates to itself by demarcating itself from the physico-chemical 
domain of the inorganic (auto-affection, automotion, etc.). On the other hand, we have the 
self-present thinking thing that Derrida designates as auto-deictic and auto-monstrative auto-
telicity (autotélie). He has the following formulation of these new concepts of “auto-telicity” 
and “auto-deicticity”: 
Every living creature, and thus every animal to the extent that it is living, has 
recognized in it this power to move spontaneously, to feel itself and to relate to itself. 
However problematic it be, that is even the characteristic of what lives, as 
traditionally conceived in opposition to the inorganic inertia of the purely physico-
chemical … But what is in dispute … is the power to make reference to the self in 
deictic or autodeictic terms, the capability at least virtually to turn a finger toward 
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oneself in order to say “this is I” … It is what says “I am speaking of me”; the one 
who says “I” shows himself in the present of his utterance, or at least of its 
manifestation. Because it is held to be incapable of this autodeictic or auto-referential 
self-distancing [autotélie] and deprived of the “I,” the animal will lack any “I think,” 
as well as understanding and reason, response and responsibility. (AIA 94)27 
Here Derrida makes explicit that human auto-relation, that is, the Cartesian presupposition of 
the modern narrative of life, consists in the metaphysical axiom of the coincidence of voice 
and consciousness that grants the self-presence and self-proximity of transcendental life. As 
we know, this axiom presupposes the dissimulation of the process of death and signification 
that has always been at work in voice and consciousness. For Derrida, it is precisely the 
deconstruction of this axiom that liberates the history of life and allows us to tell this history. 
Therefore, he sketches a “critical reelaboration” of the modern narrative of life that hinges on 
the deconstruction he had initiated many years earlier in Voice and Phenomenon. This re-
elaboration does not limit itself to pointing to examples of autodeictic autotelicity in animal 
life―such as in genetic systems as well as in social phenomena of narcissistic exhibition.28 
Above all, it is a matter of calling into question the metaphysical axiom in itself, “the axiom 
that permits one to accord purely and simply to the human or to the rational animal that 
which one holds the just plain animal to be deprived of” (AIA 95).29 From this re-elaboration, 
it follows that the Cartesian distinction between human and animal auto-relation, between “I 
think” and auto-affection, and thus the very principle of the modern narrative of life, are 
reinscribed within the ultra-transcendental conception of life as leaving a trace in the world. 
Derrida writes:  
If autoposition, the automonstrative autotely of the “I,” even in the human, implies the 
“I” to be an other that must welcome within itself some irreducible hetero-affection 
(as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere), then this autonomy of the “I” can be 
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neither pure nor rigorous; it would not be able to form the basis for a simple and linear 
differentiation of the human from the animal. (AIA 95)30 
Derrida seems to conceive of autodeictic autotelicity (whether it is animal or human) as an 
effect of the trace qua the possibility of repetition in general, that is, as the self’s relation to 
the trace of the other. In so doing, he evokes another narrative of life that accounts for the 
history and evolution of the living.31 Moreover, the deconstruction of the Cartesian axiom of 
human autotelicity propagates its effects on the concept of responsibility and its ethico-
political developments. As we know, the ability to respond to a true questioning is 
structurally linked to human auto-relation (“I think”) and autotelicity (“this is I”) and thus 
relapses into the Cartesian legacy at work in the modern narrative of life. From the 
deconstruction of this legacy and, consequently, from the reinscription of the distinction 
between animal and human auto-relation within another narrative of life, it follows that 
responsibility too is deconstructed and that the distinction between reaction and response is 
reinscribed. Here we can only point to this theoretical programme, which Derrida formulates 
in session six of the seminar The Beast and the Sovereign I (2001-2002, published after his 
death in 2008): 
And so the point would be to reinscribe this différance of reaction and response and 
thereby this historicity of ethical, juridical, or political responsibility into another 
thinking of life, living beings, into another relation of the living to their ipseity, and 
thereby to their supposed sovereignty, their autos, their own autokinesis and 
reactional automaticity, to death, technique, or to the machinic. (120) 
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     1 In the collection of essays entitled The Animal That Therefore I Am, which was published after Derrida’s 
death, and which I take up in section III, Derrida writes: “Let me note very quickly in passing, concerning 
intellectual autobiography, that … [the] very first substitution of the concept of trace or mark for those of 
speech, sign, or signifier was destined in advance, and quite deliberately, to cross the frontiers of 
anthropocentrism, the limits of a language confined to human words and discourse. Mark, gramma, trace, and 
différance refer differentially to all living things, all the relations between living and nonliving” (102). This 
concluding sentence can be read as an echo of the epigraph extracted from Grammatology. 
     2 On the consideration that Derrida has for this text within the trajectory of his work, see Positions: “In a 
classical philosophical architecture, Voice and Phenomenon would come first: in it is posed, at a point which 
appears juridically decisive for reasons that I cannot explain here, the question of the privilege of the voice and 
of phonetic writing in their relationship to the entire history of the West, such as this history can be represented 
by the history of metaphysics, and metaphysics in its most modern, critical, and vigilant form: Husserl's 
transcendental phenomenology” (5). For close readings of VP, see Marrati-Guénoun, Genesis and Trace, 
Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, and Kates, Essential History, to which I refer as my writing unfolds. To my 
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knowledge, there are no readings of VP that develop the link between the deconstruction of consciousness and 
the opening of the history of life. 
     3 See VP: “What would be at issue will be to begin to verify that the resource of the phenomenological 
critique is the metaphysical project itself, in its historical completion and in the purity of its origin albeit 
restored” (5). On this point, see Lawlor 168-169. 
     4 Derrida writes: “One would be able to bring to light the single and permanent motive for all the mistakes 
and all the perversions that Husserl denounces in ‘degenerate’ metaphysics, across a multiplicity of domains, 
themes, and arguments: it is always a blindness in the face of the authentic mode of ideality, of that which is, 
which can be repeated indefinitely in the identity of its presence because of the very fact that it does not exist, is 
not reell, is irreell” (VP 5). 
     5 See VP: “The value of presence … modifies itself, without its being lost, every time what is at issue is the 
presence of any object whatsoever to consciousness in the clear evidence of a fulfilled intuition or when what is 
at issue is self-presence in consciousness—‘consciousness’ meaning nothing other than the possibility of the 
self-presence of the present in the living present” (8).  
     6 For Derrida’s reformulation of this distinction, see VP 15. See also VP 16, where he explains his translation 
of Bedeutung by meaning or wanting-to-say (vouloir-dire). On Bedeutung, see Kates 134. 
     7 Derrida interprets this phenomenological situation as the intentional relation to the object that Husserl 
formalizes later as the noetic-noematic sphere of intentional consciousness. On this point, see VP: 
“transcendental phenomenological idealism responds to the necessity to describe the objectivity of the object 
(Gegenstand) and the presence of the present (Gegen-wart)—and the objectivity in presence—on the basis of an 
‘interiority,’ or rather on the basis of a self-proximity, an ownness (Eigenheit), which is not a simple inside, but 
the intimate possibility of the relation to an over-there and to an outside in general. That is why the essence of 
intentional consciousness will be revealed (for example, in Ideas I, § 49) only in the reduction of the totality of 
the existing world in general” (19); and VP: “Later, after the discovery of the transcendental reduction, he will 
describe the solitary life of the soul as the noetic-noematic sphere of consciousness” (27). On pure expressivity 
as the very possibility of phenomenology, see Marrati 64-65 and 68-69. 
     8 Cf. VP: “In expression the intention is absolutely on purpose because it animates a voice which can remain 
wholly internal and because the expressed is a Bedeutung, that is, an ideality that does not ‘exist’ in the world” 
(28).  
     9 Making explicit why the phenomenological concept of sign constitutes a privileged example for his reading 
of phenomenology, Derrida writes: “The determination and erasure of the sign in metaphysics is the 
dissimulation of this relation to death, which nevertheless was producing signification” (VP 53). For a definition 
of writing as the writer’s relation to death, see VP: “writing—the common name for signs that function despite 
the total absence of the subject, by means of (and beyond) his death” (79-80).  
     10 On the phenomenality of the phenomenological voice, see VP 66. Derrida also describes this 
phenomenality as the signifier’s self-effacement (or self-reduction) that is simultaneous with its production: 
“The phenomenological ‘body’ of the signifier seems to erase itself in the very moment it is produced. From this 
point on, it seems already to belong to the element of ideality. It reduces itself phenomenologically and 
transforms the mundane opacity of its body into pure diaphaneity. This erasure of the sensible body and of its 
exteriority is for consciousness the very form of the immediate presence of the signified” (VP 66). On the 
complicity between idealization and voice, see Marrati 74-75 and Lawlor 190-194. 
     11 Here Derrida refers to Hegel’s semiology as the most accomplished analysis of the complicity between 
idealization and voice. He offers a close reading of this analysis in the essay “The Pit and the Pyramid: 
Introduction to Hegel’s Semiology” (first published in 1971 and then included in Margins of Philosophy, 1972). 
     12 From the opening pages of VP, Derrida draws attention to what seems to be implied from the 
phenomenological account of ideality: the relation of “an existing in general”―not merely consciousness―to its 
own death. “Is this to say,” he asks, “that what opens the repetition to the infinite or what is opened in repetition 
when the movement of idealization is secured, is a certain relation of an ‘existent’ to his death? Is this to say that 
‘transcendental life’ is the scene of this relation?” (8).  
     13 See VP: “The possibility of everything that we believe we are able to exclude from auto-affection is 
enrooted in this pure difference: space, the outside, the world, the body, etc. As soon as we admit that auto-
affection is the condition of self-presence, no pure transcendental reduction is possible” (70-71).  
     14 Derrida continues: “This movement of différance does not supervene upon a transcendental subject. The 
movement of différance produces the transcendental subject. Auto-affection is not a modality of experience that 
characterizes a being that would already be itself (autos). Auto-affection produces the same as the self-relation 
in the difference with itself, the same as the non-identical” (VP 71). On this passage, see the excellent remarks 
in Kates 153-157. 
     15 I suggest that this understanding of auto-relation (as différance) accounts for “the concept of ultra-
transcendental life” (VP 13) that Derrida formulates in the introductory chapter of VP, a life that is the common 
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root of transcendental and empirical life. Lawlor (174-175) and Kates (138-140) draw attention to this link but 
do not develop its implications for the question of the history of life. 
     16 Cf. Marrati 75-77. 
     17 For Husserl’s text, see VP: “The originary impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the 
originary source, that starting from which all the rest is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced. It is 
not born as something produced, but by genesis spontanea, it is originary generation” (71-72). 
     18 Derrida writes: “We see that the theme of a pure interiority of speech or of ‘hearing-oneself-speak’ is 
radically contradicted by ‘time’ itself” (VP 74). 
     19 On the first part of this note, see Vitale, “The Text and the Living,” which suggests finding here Derrida’s 
decisive step beyond phenomenology towards archi-writing. In what follows, I reread the whole note in light of 
my interpretation of Voice and Phenomenon and I highlight the intersection between Derrida’s argument contra 
phenomenology and the dialectical materialism of Tran Duc Thao.  
     20 On Derrida’s relation to Thao across his early work on Husserl, see Giovannangeli, “Husserl entre Derrida 
and Tran Duc Thao.” 
     21 For Derrida’s protocols on the difference of the human and the use of the term “animal,” see Derrida, AIA 
47 and 53-54, respectively.  
     22 As a premise of an alternative narrative of life, let me recall those pages from “Typewriter Ribbon: 
Limited Ink (2)” (1998), where Derrida marks a noteworthy difference between dating mineral and plant 
sediments to the timeless time in which no living being signaled its presence on earth and taking account of the 
singular event of two midges immobilized in amber while making love. This event, he argues, still happens 
today as its trace is consigned to us. See also Without Alibi 130-131. 
     23 On the founding role of the Cartesian thought of animality, see Derrida, AIA 54. For an excellent 
development of Derrida’s reading of Descartes, see Wills, Inanimation. The analysis that I develop here differs 
from Wills’s in that it aims to cast light on the link that interweaves the deconstruction of the modern thought of 
animality and the deconstruction of phenomenological consciousness. In other words, I reread the 
deconstruction of the modern thought of animality in the wake of Derrida’s concept of ultra-transcendental life.   
     24 Descartes writes: “the whole mechanical structure [toute cette machine] of limbs which can be seen in a 
corpse, and which I called the body’’ (Meditations 17). Here we can find the metaphysical determination of 
animality as non-living or mechanical that we find evoked by Derrida in the epigraph of our text. 
     25 On this scene, Derrida remarks: “The scene and logic of the argument seem to me more strange than has 
been most often noted. Here we have a character, a man, and this man is a man who, having learned, fictitiously, 
to manufacture impeccable automatons, would conclude in reality, by means of a judgment, that the animals are 
in truth, for their part, automatons, automatons of flesh and blood. And why is this so? Because they resemble 
automatons that resemble humans. And this conclusion, let us never forget, follows from a judgment” (83).  
     26 Derrida describes responsibility as the ability to give a non-programmed response to a non-programmed 
questioning: “The question of the response is thus that of the question, of the response as response to a question 
that, at one and the same time, would remain unprogrammable and leave to the other alone the freedom to 
respond, presuming that were possible (a technohistorical field with a bright future, even though the 
programmation of question and response seems to foreclose the future). The Cartesian animal, like its 
descendants (once again I’ll try to recognize there Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, and Levinas, which also means so 
many others), would remain incapable of responding to true questioning” (AIA 84).  
     27 Derrida has recourse to the concept of autotelicity for the first time in “To Speculate – On ‘Freud’” 
(included in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond). In this text, he highlights the deconstruction 
of autotelicity, understood as the movement of teleological auto-institution, by focusing on the process of the 
tele- (différance, the originary possibility of writing/posting, tele-communication, etc.) that is at work in that 
movement. For this reason, Derrida’s “autotelicity” has already meant “self-distancing,” as the English 
translator seems to suggest with his choice. As for the concept of the autodeictic, I suggest that here Derrida 
refers to the kind of monstration that takes place in the phenomenological situation of pure expression in the 
solitary life of the soul―that is, voice. On this kind of monstration (Hinzeigen), which is not an indication, I 
refer to the beautiful remarks that Derrida makes in VP 64. For an adventurous reading of autotelicity in the 
wake of a preoriginary rhetoricity, see Davis, “Autozoography.” 
     28 For these examples, see AIA 95. 
     29 On Derrida’s concern for the philosophical argument rather than the scientific falsification of the modern 
thought of animality, see the important observations in Naas 16-17. Pushing these observations further, I argue 
that here Derrida is interested in reinscribing the thought of animality back to the thinking of life as leaving a 
trace in the world that he has been elaborating throughout his work and that, on his view, allows us to tell the 
history of life.  
     30 Here it is worth recalling the increasing attention to Husserl’s work on animality in current philosophical 
debates. In particular, I refer to Di Martino, “Husserl and the Question of Animality,” as representative of this 
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line of research. Drawing on Di Martino’s close reading of the analyses developed in volume 15 of the 
Husserliana, it seems that Husserl subscribes to the Cartesian legacy as it is displayed by Derrida in AIA. As Di 
Martino points out, Husserl identifies the correlative of “the historical-cultural world” specifically inhabited by 
the human with “the personal self,” that is, “the self-conscious and free self, necessarily implicated in the 
unfolding of the historical-cultural world” (61). Furthermore, this personal self is placed within a community 
that is jointly empathic and linguistic (Di Martino 65-66). In other words, the Husserlian conception of the 
human being seems to presuppose the autodeictic autotelicity evoked by Derrida in his reading of Descartes. 
From this perspective, it undergoes Derrida’s critical elaboration of the modern narrative of life.  
     31 On the deconstructive conception of autodeicticity, permit me to refer to my forthcoming reading of 
Derrida’s engagement with the autobiographical question in Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
